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Abstract 
The computation of structural primary balances for the nine main Latin American countries 
and their comparison of their changes with their cyclical position during the period 
1981-2004 confirms that fiscal policy is procyclical in the region. From this evidence, the 
paper shows strong evidence that the fiscal behaviour is closely linked to the financial 
vulnerability position of the economies and in particular to the perception on the 
sustainability of debt. The current threshold balance, defined as the primary balance which 
would render the debt stable under the existing economic and financial conditions, is used 
as our gauge for measuring debt sustainability at each point in time. The empirical analysis 
reveals that the fiscal stance tightens when the debt sustainability perceptions worsen, and 
that this effect is stronger the less sustainable debt is perceived. The results are robust to 
different specifications and estimation methods. 
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1 Introduction 
Fiscal policy is expected to play an important stabilizing role over the business cycle. When 
the economy is accelerating, the fiscal authorities should be able to moderate activity by 
restraining the fiscal stance and, vice versa, in downturns fiscal policy can help stimulating 
the economy. Therefore, under these circumstances, fiscal policy is expected to behave 
countercyclically. However, the empirical evidence has repeatedly shown that fiscal policy has 
been procyclical in many countries, in particular in Latin America1. This is a rather unfortunate 
feature of the region, since it introduces an additional source of volatility to the economy, 
so that when the economy expands, it reinforces the expansion; when it contracts, it deepens 
the slowdown. Also, according to Serven (1998), among others, the increase in volatility 
reduces investment and growth. 
The neoclassical theory of fiscal policy [Barro (1979)] conveys tax smoothing as a 
way to accommodate transitory shocks to activity, as long as the intertemporal budget 
constraint is fulfilled. In those circumstances public debt fluctuations act as a buffer stock for 
shocks to activity and they enable fiscal policy to play its countercyclical role. The question is 
what happens when (negative) economic shocks strongly impinge on the level of debt, too, 
arising concerns about the fulfilment of the intertemporal budget constraint or, in other words, 
on the sustainability of debt. In those cases the mechanism is short-circuited and this can 
jeopardise the stabilizing role of fiscal policy. 
This seems to be the case in Latin America. Gavin and Perotti (1997) have observed 
that there creditworthiness and sustainability concerns are central to determine fiscal stances. 
The dependence of Latin American finances on external sources of credit and the periodic 
recurrence of sudden stops, that is, the abrupt loss of access to external credit and the 
volatility of financial indicators –reflected on volatility in the debt stock and service– are behind 
this situation. Furthermore, periods of difficult access to international capital markets tend to 
induce restrictive macroeconomic policies, but they also translate into large current account 
reversals, which are catalysed, among other channels, through economic downturns. The 
slowdown in economic activity aggravates the fiscal solvency which, in turn, calls for an 
additional tightening. Hence, the capital flow cycle and the macroeconomic policy cycle tend 
to reinforce each other, or, as Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004) have labelled it, in these 
economies, when it rains, it pours. 
As an additional argument, Riascos and Vegh (2003) argue that the incompleteness 
of financial markets in emerging economies could explain procyclical fiscal policy as the 
outcome of a Ramsey problem without having to impose additional frictions. 
Finally, a complementary rationale to explain fiscal procyclicality is rooted in political 
economy distorsions and is related to what Lane and Tornell (1999) have labelled voracity 
effects2. According to this view, the ability to run large budget surpluses in good times is 
severely hampered by political pressures which, though always present, get exacerbated 
in times of plenty. As a result, fiscal resources are wasted in favour of any rent-seeking group 
                                                                          
1. See, among others, Gavin et al. (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Alberola and Molina (2003), Kaminsky, Reinhart and 
Vegh (2004) Talvi and Vegh (2005) or Manasse (2006). 
2. See also Alesina and Tabelllini (2005). 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 10 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0611 
rather than saved for bad times3. Lane (2003) provides empirical support for political economy 
factors in determining the fiscal policy stance in OECD countries. This notwithstanding, he 
recognizes that government debt constraints can seriously limit the room for manouver for 
fiscal policy in emerging markets. 
It is remarkable that, notwithstanding the conventional wisdom that fiscal policy is 
procycllical in Latin America, the empirical approaches in order to test the issue and explain 
the reasons in a rigorous way have been scant. The main reason has probably been the 
difficulty to derive adequate gauges for the fiscal stance in Latin America, due to lack or 
inadequacy of data and to the extreme volatility of macroeconomic and financial variables in 
the region. These factors have hindered the computation of structural fiscal balances, which 
is the most common indicator to assess the fiscal stance in OECD countries. That is why 
most papers have studied this issue analyzing the cyclical correlations between government 
spending, tax rates, the overall fiscal balance and the primary fiscal balance and the GDP 
cycle4. 
In this paper, we aim at overcoming these problems in order to explore in a 
systematic way  whether and how the perception of creditworthiness and debt sustainability 
is key to explain the procyclicality of fiscal policy. We build on previous evidence by 
Alberola and Molina (2003), who show that in emerging markets fiscal balances are 
determined by the financing costs and that they are closely related to the cycle. Our approach 
is related to the empirical literature on fiscal rules and fiscal policy sustainability [see, inter 
alia, Bohn (1998)]. The focus of this literature lies on whether governments react to debt 
accumulation by increasing primary balances or not, such that their fiscal behaviour is 
consistent with the intertemporal budget constraint. However, in this alternativa approach 
the focus is on the mean reverting properties of debt, that is on long-run, thus dismissing, 
on the one hand, the cyclical components and on the other hand, the temporary swings in 
debt sustainability perception which are at the core of our hypothesis. 
 Our strategy consists of two steps. First, we check the procyclicality of fiscal policy. 
Second, we search for an explanation to this behaviour, focusing on the perceived 
creditworthiness of the country, which, simultaneously influences and is influenced by the 
access to external credit. 
 To attain the first goal, we compute the structural primary balance for nine countries 
of the region for the period 1981-2004, taking advantage of recent improvements in filtering 
techniques to derive the output gap. The changes in the structural primary balance define 
the fiscal stance which is compared to the cyclical position of the economy: an increase in the 
structural balance at a time of economic upturn would signal a countercyclical and, thus, 
stabilising role for fiscal policy. 
Secondly, the perceived creditworthiness of a country is closely related to its 
indebtedness position. While the level of debt to GDP is not too large, specially when 
compared to other developed countries like some EU states or Japan, Latin America suffers 
                                                                          
3. The theory behind this argument is that interest groups view fiscal resources as a common pool and they compete for 
a share in that pool. Each group will be unwilling to reduce its claim on an increase in fiscal resources, knowing that the 
benefits of this moderation would accrue to other interest groups. Therefore, deviations from a countercyclical policy 
may be an indirect way of fending off spending pressure through, for instance, tax cuts when the economy is in 
expansion. But it will not be optimal to resist all spending pressures, so government spending is also expected to 
increase. 
4. For a thorough discussion of the problems posed by this methodology see Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh (2004). 
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from debt intolerance, as Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2002) have labelled it. This 
intolerance can be explained by the previous history of debt defaults, economic instability 
and weak institutions, which determine not only a higher financing cost, but also a debt 
structure that is biased towards foreign currency and short maturities. These features 
combine with the tendency to suffer dramatic swings in the financing conditions, which 
impinge on the perception of creditworthiness and may even cut off their access to the 
international financial markets. Under these circumstances, the critical debt thresholds are 
much lower than in the OECD countries and the financing conditions display a higher volatility. 
Hence, the use in the second part of the paper of an indicator of debt sustainability 
to assess fiscal creditworthiness. Furthermore, debt dynamics are very sensitive to financing 
conditions. This means both that the assessment of creditworthiness can be quite volatile and 
that it can be self-feeding as long as the perception of vulnerability affects the evolution of 
financial variables. As a matter of fact, we depart from previous contributions by stressing 
the role played by current financing conditions in determining public debt sustainability. More 
precisely, we define the current threshold balance as the primary balance which renders 
public debt stable at each point in time. Primary balances above such threshold would imply 
that the debt is sustainable. This indicator will be used to uncover the relation between the 
fiscal stance and public debt sustainability. 
We find a strong empirical backing for our hypothesis. First, the panel data analysis 
shows a strong and significant negative correlation between the changes in the structural 
primary balance and the output gap, so that they confirm that fiscal policy is procyclical in 
Latin America. After having stated this, we move on to show how debt sustainability issues 
affect the fiscal behaviour. The empirical evidence shows that a deterioration of the current 
threshold balance induces a fiscal tightening and that this tightening tends to be stronger the 
worse the initial debt sustainability position is5. These results can be taken as strong evidence 
that debt sustainability concerns play a determinant role in explaining the fiscal behaviour in 
Latin America and the procyclical bias of fiscal policy. In fact, it is shown that for most of the 
specifications public debt sustainability concerns seem to account, from a statistical point of 
view, for the whole procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the method 
employed to compute structural primary balances and studies whether fiscal policy is 
procyclical or not. Section 3 explains how an indicator of fiscal sustainability is constructed 
and then, it analyzes whether the fiscal stance is related to the sustainability of public debt. 
Section 4 contains some concluding remarks. 
                                                                          
5. Note that this approach is somehow related to the empirical literature on fiscal rules and fiscal policy sustainability 
[see, inter alia, Bohn (1998)]. The focus of this literature lies on whether governments react to debt accumulation 
by increasing primary balances or not, such that their fiscal behaviour is consistent with the intertemporal budget 
constraint. The idea is that a positive response of the primary balance to public debt ensures that any upward movement 
in the debt to GDP ratio due to negative shocks (e. g., low growth, wars, higher interest rates) would be eventually 
reversed through primary surpluses. 
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2 The procyclicality of fiscal policy 
The specification of structural or cyclically-adjusted balances has centered a great deal of 
effort to come up with a universally accepted methodology to separate the budget balance 
into its structural and cyclical components. All the available methods involve two main 
steps. First, the cyclical fluctuations (output gaps) are derived by subtracting the potential 
or trend output from actual output and expressing the difference as a percentage of the 
former. Second, the cyclical component of the budgetary balance is estimated through 
the application of fiscal elasticities to GDP and, for some cases, commodity prices. 
Finally, this cyclical component is deducted from the actual budget balance to derive 
the structural (cyclically-adjusted) component. This is the approach used by most of the 
international organizations and national authorities. The main difference among methodologies 
involves the calculation of the output gap, which is estimated either via a smoothing technique 
(Hodrick-Prescott) or through a production function [Giorno et al. (1995)]. 
Structural balances is a widely used tool to assess the fiscal stance in industrialized 
countries, where the availability of long term statistics and the relative stability of the economic 
environment has allowed to develop increasingly improved techniques to filter out the cyclical 
balances. In fact, in the last years a preference has been observed towards the second 
method (which was already used by OECD and IMF), after the shift of the EC towards it. 
Estimates of the cycle based on this method require the availability of reliable data on the use 
of labour and capital stocks. 
 In Latin America, the computation of structural balances has traditionally been 
hindered by the lack of long series of data, the extreme volatility of the macroeconomic 
variables and the noise in the fiscal data derived from dramatic structural changes and/or 
composition of revenues and expenditure. Furthermore the volatility of revenues is closely 
associated to the evolution of commodity prices and exports which, in several countries, are 
an important source of fiscal financing. Given these obstacles, and in spite of the recent 
efforts made in some countries, like Chile, the estimates of structural balances for the 
countries in the region are scant and a joint estimation of these balances for the whole region 
is, to our knowledge, non-existent6. Here, as a starting point to our empirical analysis, we aim 
at filling this gap by estimating the primary structural balances for the nine main countries of 
Latin America. 
The methodology we will use to derive the trend output is smoothing through the 
Hodrick-Prescott (1997) filter. Since it is being abandoned in OECD countries some 
motivation for this option is in order. First, lack of data availability and homogeneity. It is well 
known that labour statistics in Latin America are unreliable due to the importance of 
the informal economy and that capital stocks are difficult to measure in general, and more 
prominently in these countries; second, given the recurrence of economic crises, the concept 
of potential output that underlies the use of full capacity of production factors loses 
some clarity. In particular, if we think of the disruptions that economic crises provoke in 
these economies, the cyclical position is clearly not the only element which drives a wedge 
between potential and actual output. Finally, the recent refinement of filtering techniques 
                                                                          
6. A notable exception is “Sostenibilidad fiscal en la región andina. Políticas e instituciones”, Corporación Andina de 
Fomento (2004). 
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allows for a more precise estimation of the cycle, also in the cases of variables with large 
variability, like in the Latin American case. 
2.1 Estimation of the trend output and the primary  structural balances 
The trend output is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the real GDP series. 
Let Y denote actual real GDP and Y* real trend GDP. Then, the estimate of the output gap 
(GAP) is obtained taking the quotient of the difference between GDP and trend output, that is, 
1Y YGAP
Y
*
*
( )
−=  
In practice, we proceed along the lines set forth by Kaiser and Maravall (1999) to 
improve on the performance of the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Given the high volatility of Latin 
American output, we pre-adjusted the series by identifying outliers and then extracting them 
from the original series. These outliers were assumed to be transitory and were, thus, 
they end up assigned to the cyclical component of output. Also, to overcome accuracy 
problems in both ends of the series, we added forecasts and backcasts for further periods7. 
At this stage, we used actual data for the beginning of the series and forecasts from 
Consensus Forecasts for the end of the sample8, instead of the model-based method 
suggested by Kaiser and Maravall (1999). 
  Calculating cyclically-adjusted balances once the output gap measure has been 
estimated involves to single out the budgetary items which are assumed to display a cyclical 
pattern. In developed countries, such items usually involve different types of revenues and 
some cycle-sensitive expenditures, such as unemployment benefits. However, for Latin 
America, the lack of generalized unemployment subsidies and of appropriate data on this 
kind of subsidies advises for a simplified scheme, where only revenues (T), taken as a whole, 
are considered as cyclically sensitive. In order to filter out the cyclical part of revenues, the 
elasticity of T to activity is computed from the following regression. 
t t tT Ylog logα β ε= + +  (2) 
so that the cyclically adjusted revenues TS are estimated as9 
S t
t t
t
Y
T T
Y
* β⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
Moreover, for an important number of Latin American countries, the revenues are 
heavily influenced by commodity-related taxes or excises, which also have a bearing with 
the level of activity and whose prices tend to be rather volatile, affecting the cyclical profile of 
public revenues. Therefore, it is customary to address the estimation of structural primary 
balances in these countries taking into account the evolution of commodities revenues. In our 
sample, Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia –all of them oil exporters– and Chile (copper), 
                                                                          
7. Part of the computations were carried out with the Tramo/Seats program developed by Gómez and Maravall (1996).  
8. Where there were no forecasts available we employed estimates from the IMF’s Article IV reviews (Ecuador and 
Uruguay). 
9. The fact that the elasticity is computed on overall revenues tends to exact too much cyclicality from the revenues. This 
is why it is also convenient to impose, as a robustness check, a unitary elasticity in the analysis as we will do in the next 
section. 
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where the share fiscal revenues from commodities is substantial, the computation of 
structural revenues and balance is accordingly modified: 
S t t
t t comm
t t
Y p
T T
Y p
* *β φ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (4) 
where pcomm and p* are, respectively, the real prices of commodities and the notional real 
equilibrium price of the commodity, and the elasticities are estimated through the following 
regression: 
comm
t t t tT Y plog log logα β φ ε= + + +  (5) 
The trend real commodity price (p*) is calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter to the real price series. This method provides a desired degree of homogeneity, but at a 
cost in terms of precision. The structural balance is computed by just substracting from 
the cyclically-adjusted revenues the overall public expenditures (Gt). However, in order to 
define more properly the fiscal stance it is pertinent, even more in Latin America, to deduce 
from the expenditures the interest payments on public debt (IPt), since this is a volatile 
source of expenditure which is clearly out of the discretion of the authorities. In this way, 
we obtain the primary structural balance (SPBt), according to the following expression, where 
it is important to note that all variables are expressed in terms of GDP, 
S
t t t tSPB T G IP( )= − −  (6) 
The fiscal stance will be given by the changes in the structural primary balance 
(∆SPBt). An increase (decrease) in the structural primary balance signals a contractionary 
(expansionary) fiscal stance. 
2.2 Fiscal stance and the cycle 
Our sample covers nine Latin American countries for the period 1981 to 200410. The output 
gap has been computed making use of two different  λ  in the Hodrick-Prescott filter: λ=6.7,  
as recommended by Maravall and del Rio (2001), and  λ=100, which is the usual figure and 
that delivers wider cycles. The fiscal stance has required the computation of the revenue 
elasticities with respect to GDP for each country and also for commodities revenues for the 
aforementioned countries (see table 111). Note that the elasticities are clustered around values 
higher than 1.5 for most countries, and are strongly significant for all countries but 
Venezuela12. 
The figures in graph 1 present the output gap and the changes in the structural 
balance –our gauge for the fiscal stance– of each country for λ=6.7. In the figures it can be 
                                                                          
10. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Our basic 
sources for the fiscal variables are the IMF Government Finance Statistics and International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
which have been complemented, when necessary, with national statistics. Due to data limitations fiscal variables have 
been computed for the central government. GDP data come from the IFS. 
11. The elasticities have been estimated by Dynamic OLS (see Stock and Watson, 1993). All the series have been 
pre-adjusted with TRAMO/SEATS in order to remove outliers that might bias the estimation. 
12. The case of Chile deserves particular attention. Estimates for equation (5) yielded a negative elasticity for the real 
copper price, which is puzzling. Therefore, we decided to employ the GDP elasticities obtained by Marcel et al. (2001) 
and a unit elasticity for the real copper price, which would be approximately equivalent to the elasticity implied by 
their method. Results are not modified for copper-price elasticities around unity. In the case of the GDP elasticity, we 
present the results for the lower range of their estimates (which is between 0.7 and 1.25), though the results are not 
sensitive to this choice. 
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seen in many cases that the fiscal stance is contractionary –SPB increases– when the output 
gap is negative, suggesting that the fiscal policy has been procyclical. 
A proper statistical analysis of this hint appears in table 2A, where the correlation 
between ∆SPBt and the output gap is negative for both λs, except in Chile and, for λ=6.7, 
Ecuador. By regressing both variables, it can be observed analogously that the slope 
coefficient is significantly negative –with 90% probability– in one third of the cases, and 
inequivocally so in Peru and Uruguay. In the second part of the table, which uses the value 
100 for λ,  Argentina and Brazil are also significant. Therefore, Chile seems to be the only 
country where the fiscal stance has been somehow countercyclical (a positive, though 
non-significant, relationship between the output gap and the changes in SPB). For the sake of 
completeness, table 2B performs the same computations but, instead of using the estimated 
elasticities, these are set to one, as it is done sometimes in order to estimate the fiscal 
impulse by the IMF13. 
A preliminary aggregate picture for the region can be obtained by looking at 
the scatter plot in graph 2. The de-meaned output gaps and changes in structural balances 
are plotted against each other. The evident negative slope of the regression line confirms, at a 
glance, the apparent procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America. For the sake of 
comparison, we have also plotted the same relationship for the US14, where it is apparent that 
a positive correlation exists in this case –which as it turns out is statistically significant– 
denoting the expected countercyclicality of fiscal policy. It is important to note, however, 
that the same analysis carried out for all OECD countries shows that in some of them fiscal 
policy –according to this criterion– has been procyclical, even significantly, at least for some 
parts of the period considered. This implies that the criterion is rather strict and that 
the procyclicality of fiscal policies is not an exclusive feature of Latin American economies, 
although here it has been more intense and protracted. 
The econometric counterpart of this scatter plot is the panel data analysis which 
appears in table 3 for the two λs15 considered.  A panel regression of the fiscal stance on the 
output gap, with both fixed and random effects, is presented. The estimated coefficient is 
always negative and strongly significant, which yields a very strong and robust evidence of 
the procyclicality of the fiscal stance in Latin America. The two final columns of the table 
divide the sample into two periods, comparing the 80s with the 90s. It turns out that the 
negative sign is not significant for the first part of the sample, although the point estimates 
are quite similar. A possible reason for the weaker result in the eighties is the relevance of 
monetary financing of the deficit, which may introduce some noise in the data, since inflation 
enabled fiscal authorities to mask the actual deficit figures16. 
 In graph 3 the notion of time stability of the parameters is further explored. The 
upper chart displays the slope parameter of the previous regression in a recursive estimation, 
starting with the period 1981-1987 and adding one observation at a time. The parameter is 
                                                                          
13. The fiscal impulse also implies computing the structural public expenditures as a function of potential output, with a 
unit elasticity which is, after all, very similar to just taking expenditure as given. Another reason to look at this alternative 
measure is that the filtering out of overall public revenues with estimated elasticities, like in this case,  tends to extract, 
by construction, all the cyclicality from the revenues, not only that associated to the automatic stabilizers. 
14. Both the output gap and the structural primary balance come from the OECD statistics database. 
15. The results are very similar when using a unit elasticity for public revenues. 
16. These results may also be driven by the presence of Chile, which is the only country with some evidence of 
countercyclicality of fiscal policy. In fact, when this country is excluded from the sample, the negative sign recovers 
its statistical significance for the decade of the 80s. For a more detailed analysis of the impact of inflation on public 
finances. see Alberola and Molina (2003). 
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very stable: it moves in a very narrow range between -0.10 and -0.15, and it is significant after 
the year 1997 is included. The lower chart is, alternatively, a rolling regression, starting as 
before in the seven-year window 1981-1987 but deleting and adding one observation at a 
time to keep unchanged the size of the window. Here, as expected, it is observed a higher 
variability but again it is relatively stable. Furthermore, in this chart it can be observed that 
through time, and mainly in the second half of the nineties, the fiscal policy tended to become 
more procyclical17. Only the recent recovery period seems to have bucked that trend. 
                                                                          
17. These results are again reinforced if we remove Chile from the analysis. 
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3 Debt sustainability and the fiscal stance 
The results so far have robustly confirmed that, far from playing its expected stabilizing role, 
fiscal policy has been procyclical in Latin America: economic expansions have tended to 
be accompanied by expansionary fiscal policies, while the downturns of the cycle were 
worsened by a contractionary fiscal stance. The rest of the paper is devoted to explaining this 
puzzling result. Our main suspect is the influence that the concerns on the sustainability 
of public debt have on the fiscal policy stance through the cycle. 
Obviously, the level of debt is a central element in this assessment and a 
fundamental constraint for fiscal policy, but it will only be expected to be effectively 
binding throughout the cycle when two circumstances concur: i) debt is high enough to 
influence fiscal policy in the short run, and ii) its financing conditions, including its cost, are 
closely related to the cycle. As suggested in the introduction, both conditions may hold 
for many Latin American countries. 
3.1 An indicator of fiscal sustainability. The current threshold balance 
This section is thus focused on developing a feasible indicator to explore the links 
between the fiscal stance and the debt sustainability concerns. Our indicator is adapted from 
a simplified, static version of the debt sustainability analysis, used among others by 
Blanchard (1990)18. According to the conventional definition, debt will be sustainable at 
any point of time when the value of current debt is lower than the net present value of 
future primary balances, that is, the fiscal balance once the interest payments on debt are 
deducted. This definition, simple as it is, faces the problem of not being operative, since it is 
quite difficult to derive the series of future fiscal balances or to impose a particular rate of 
discount on the future. 
A more pragmatic approach is to determine the dynamics of debt, which evolves 
according to a limited number of parameters. From here it is possible to derive an indicator of 
fiscal sustainability which can be used for our purposes. The starting point is the fiscal budget 
constraint of the government, which can be expressed, after some algebra, as: 
1 111 1
t t t t t
t t t t
t t
r g r e g
D PB D D
g g
*( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
α α− −− + ∆ −∆ = − + + −+ +  (7) 
where PBt is the primary balance and Dt is the stock of public debt at the end of time t, 
both expressed as a ratio of GDP. There are two different types of debt to be considered: 
domestic debt and external debt, which have, respectively, a share α and 1-α in the 
total stock of debt, and their real interest rates are rt and  r*t . ∆et is the change in the nominal 
exchange rate –where an increase in e represents an exchange rate depreciation–, and gt is 
the real rate of growth19. 
                                                                          
18. This sort of analysis has gained pre-eminence in the last years in the framework of financing programs by 
international financial institutions, since debt sustainability is becoming an increasingly recognized pre-condition 
for lending. As a consequence, the toolkit for deriving debt sustainability paths is blossoming and becoming 
increasingly sophisticated. 
19. This expression implies a first set of simplifications which are relevant in Latin America. First, contingent liabilities are 
not included, though they constitute an important consideration for fiscal sustainability; second, in the opposite direction, 
privatization receipts can be used to reduce debt and this is also relevant in the region, in particular during the 90s. 
Third, another type of debt, indexed debt, is also relevant in most countries. The debt, usually domestic, can be indexed 
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Primary surpluses, which reflect the excess government resources over expenditure, 
reduce the debt stock, which is an increasing function of the domestic and foreign real 
interest rates and the exchange rate depreciation, and a negative function of growth. 
 From expression (7) a useful indicator of fiscal sustainability can be simply derived. 
By just setting ∆Dt=0, the threshold value for the primary balance which would render 
the debt stable is obtained20. Above that threshold public debt will be sustainable. We will 
denote this value as the current threshold (primary) balance (CTBt): CTBt=PBt such that 
∆Dt=0, that is, 
1 111 1
t t t t t
t t t
t t
r g r e g
CTB D D
g g
*( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
α α− −− + ∆ −= + −+ +  (8) 
An important question is which horizon to use to derive the values of the right hand 
side variables. Since we have a particular interest on the evolving perception of debt 
sustainability and creditworthiness, the parameters that we use will be the observed ones, 
rather than the long-run equilibrium or trend forecasts, thus departing further from other 
approaches that assess debt sustainability21. 
All in all, we aim at obtaining a threshold for the fiscal primary balance under the 
current economic conditions such that the ratio of debt to GDP remains stable. The data 
for computing the current threshold balance may not seem too demanding: interest rates on 
domestic and foreign debt, inflation, growth and the stock of foreign and domestic debt. 
As mentioned in the first part of the paper, there exist data on total interest payments (IP), 
but data on domestic and foreign debt and their real interest rates is not readily available22. 
Therefore, we need to develop a reduced version of (8) to derive a computable empirical 
counterpart. We proceed by rearranging (8) as follows: 
{ } 11 1 tt t t t t tDCTB r r e g g*( )( ) ( )α α −⎡ ⎤= + + ∆ − −⎣ ⎦ +  (9) 
Then, note that 
IPt=[αrt+(1-α)(r*t+∆et)]Dt-1≡ρtDt-1 (10) 
where ρ denotes the average cost of debt and, empirically, it will be implicitly derived by 
dividing the observed interest payments over the  debt stock (IPt/Dt-1). Therefore, the current 
threshold balance can be computed as: 
11
t t
t t
t
g
CTB D
g
( )
( )
ρ
−
−= +  (11) 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the exchange rate, the interest rate and, as more recently, to the inflation rate. Indexation implies neutralizing the 
effects of the variable to which the debt is indexed in the above expression. 
20. This indicator is based on Blanchard (1990), who derived a similar indicator for fiscal sustainability, based on the 
expected mean values of the variables over a fixed finite horizon. 
21. The IMF, for instance, uses forecasts for the variables of interest. 
22. As in the previous section, the main sources for the debt ratios and interest payments are GFS and IFS, 
complemented with national statistics. In this case, the definition of government used is the consolidated public sector. 
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Hence, by employing the implicit real interest rate we can account, in a simple way, 
for all types of debt instruments used by each government. Besides, this measure also 
includes movements in domestic and foreign interest rates, as well as fluctuations in nominal 
exchange rates. We are interested in these variables, since we want to capture changes in 
concerns about public solvency. 
3.2 The influence of the current threshold balance on the fiscal stance 
Figure 4 plots the current threshold balance (CTB), country by country, along with the 
changes in the primary balances (PB) and the changes in the stock of debt. As expected, in 
most of the cases, it can be observed that when CTB is higher than the  primary balance, the 
stock of public debt increases, and vice versa. The magnitude of the changes in the stock of 
debt do not correspond to the gap between CTB and PB, due mainly to valuation effects but 
also to the fact that the available data for debt usually refer to the whole public sector, 
including central government, public enterprises, regional government, etc, while the data on 
fiscal balances refer just to the central government in most of cases. This implies a certain 
inconsistency between public debt and the public deficit to which this debt is compared. 
A persistent positive gap between the current threshold balance and the primary balance 
would deliver an unsustainable fiscal position, since debt would be continuously increasing. It 
is important to underscore that the graph compares fiscal outcomes with contemporaneous 
economic and financial conditions, so some caution is required when making assessment on 
the  medium-term  sustainability of debt from this compar-ison. 
In any case, this seems an adequate framework to measure the impact of 
sustainability concerns on the fiscal stance23. More precisely, since we are particularly 
concerned with the dynamics of fiscal adjustment through the cycle, we focus on 
the relationship between changes in CTB and the changes in the structural primary 
balance (SPB). We would expect this relationship to be positive (see graph 5): a worsening 
in the perceived sustainability of public debt should be followed by a fiscal tightening. 
Note that this is slightly different from the rationale linking the CTB to fiscal policy, since 
the current threshold is linked above to the primary balance (PB) rather than to SPB. 
There are two reasons to proceed as we do. First, the SPB by definition filter out the cyclical 
conditions and therefore gives a more accurate view of the pro-active adjustment (call it 
discretion although this is not completely precise) that fiscal authorities have to undertake 
when sustainability concerns arise. Second, if PB is used, given that a cyclical downturn, as 
represented by a fall in g, implies a higher CTB and a lower primary balance, the expected 
positive correlation between CTB and PB would be blurred. In any case, on the one hand, 
the PB and the SPB will converge in the long-run and, on the other, we think that looking 
at this alternative can deliver interesting insights to the analysis, so we will present the results 
for both variables, PB and SPB. The scatter plot in graph 5 is a first approximation to this 
intuition, which now we intend to test in a more formal framework. 
                                                                          
23. Certain outliers in figure 4 are related to specific situations  which may distort  the results, as the default in 
Argentina –which implied a great fall in interest payments– so this advises for taking such outliers out of the sample. 
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3.3 Empirical specification and econometric issues 
The empirical analysis is framed within the following regression: 
 0 1 2 3 1 4it i it it it it itSPB CTB PB CTB CONTROLS u( )δ δ δ δ δ−∆ = + + ∆ + − + +                                 (12) 
The impact of sustainability concerns on the fiscal stance can be assessed by 
regressing the changes of the structural primary balance (∆SPBt) on the changes in the 
current threshold balance (∆CTBt). A positive sign should be expected for δ2 in (12). 
The simple relationship sketched here does not take into account an important 
consideration: the reaction of fiscal policy to the deterioration of the sustainability conditions 
is expected to be commensurate to the effective debt sustainability position, that is, not only 
depends on the changes in sustainability, but also on the existence and magnitude of a debt 
sustainability problem. Indeed, this is the gist of our argument. As suggested above, if 
there were no foreseeable sustainability problems there is no reason to restrain fiscal policy 
when the financing conditions –and the cycle, deteriorate. In such a case, fiscal policy is 
supposed to have a stabilizing role (reflected in a countercyclical fiscal stance). As explained 
above, the gauge for sustainability is the difference between the level of the primary 
balance and the current threshold balance, which can be denoted as sustainability gap. 
Therefore, we introduce this term [PBit-1-CTBit-1], with a lag, in the regression, as a kind of 
error correction mechanism: in order to trim eventual sustainability problems, the structural 
balance will have to increase when the gap is negative, delivering an expected negative 
sign (δ3<024). The second expected impact is to increase the value of δ2, since the fiscal 
stance is expected to react less when there exists no problems of sustainability. 
Finally, it is convenient to consider other variables in the regression, as controls, in 
order to obtain a cleaner picture of the actual impact of the financing conditions on the fiscal 
stance. These include prominently the change in the inflation rate, to account for shocks 
to seignorage and possible Patinkin/Olivera-Tanzi25 effects, the log change in the terms of 
trade index, to control for the impact of commodity-price shocks on the public accounts26, 
and the output gap, in order to check to what extent the procyclicality of fiscal policy is 
maintained when the financing conditions are accounted for. We also include two dummy 
variables for the years in which a country’s public debt securities were in default or its bank 
loans were in default (the Brady Plan years). 
As regards econometric issues, equation (12) is repeated here for convenience: 
0 1 2 3 1 1 4it i it it it it itSPB CTB PB CTB CONTROLS u( )δ δ δ δ δ− −∆ = + + ∆ + − + +  
where i denotes country and t year. The coefficient δ1i absorbs country fixed-effects, which 
may reflect differing fiscal institutions across countries, as well as measurement errors and 
other unobservable heterogeneity due to country characteristics. We assume that 
disturbances uit are independent across countries, but arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity 
across countries and time are allowed. The set of regressors used here could potentially 
                                                                          
24. It would be more precise to use SPB instead of  PB for this expression to qualify as error correction term. Actually, 
the results –presented below-are very similar with both specifications. 
25. The Patinkin effect implies a positive effect of the inflation rate on the primary balance through the negative impact of 
inflation on public spending, while the Olivera-Tanzi effect acts the other way round, through a decline in real tax 
revenues as inflation rises. 
26. Note that this variable should be non-significant, since we have filtered out from the public revenues the commodity 
price component. 
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include endogenous variables (correlated with the error term). The first obvious candidate 
is CTB, since a fiscal shock to SPB is bound to affect the estimate of CTB through both the 
real interest rate paid and the growth rate. Also, the variable (PBit-1-CTBit-1) can be regarded 
as predetermined, since it is expected to be correlated with past fiscal shocks on the SPB. 
Another potential endogenous variable might be the change in the inflation rate, since it is 
quite agreed that in the 80s the Latin American inflation process had predominantly a fiscal 
motivation. 
To address the problem of possible omitted variable bias induced by the presence 
of country fixed effects, we will rely on equation differencing, except when the fixed 
effects estimator is used. Also, to address the problem of endogeneity, instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation methods will be used, where suitably lagged values of the 
original independent variables, including lagged values of the dependent variable, might 
be used as instruments for the right hand side variables of the differenced equation. In this 
context, since we are working with a short sample, we have to be very careful when 
deciding the estimation method used. One possibility is to employ GMM estimators, but as it 
is well known, these estimators can be subject to potentially severe overfitting biases in small 
samples when based on too many moment conditions [Bond (2002)], and to a problem of 
weak instruments, since deep lags of the variables might be poor instruments. 
Moreover, we are in a context in which N, the number of countries, is small relative 
to T, the length of the sample period, so these estimators are not as robust as in the case 
where N is large and T fixed. In our context the fixed effects estimator would be consistent, 
but only under the strict exogeneity of the regressors, which as argued before, it is not 
the case. 
Therefore, we will carry out our estimation exercise using two IV methods, besides 
the fixed effects estimator, in order to check the robustness of our results to the 
estimation method. First, we will use the GMM estimator in first differences [see Arellano and 
Bond (1991)] with a highly restricted set of instruments, which in fact will be quite like 
the Anderson and Hsiao (1981 and 1982) estimator. This estimator is consistent in large T 
panels, but it is inefficient, since it does not account for the moving average process induced 
in the error term by first differencing. For this reason a GMM estimator à la Arellano-Bond with 
a highly restricted instrument set will be used. Second, given the high risk of overfitting in 
the GMM estimator, we will employ an IV estimator with just about 5 instruments, which will 
be suitable lags of the variables under consideration. 
3.4 Results 
Tables 4A-4C present the baseline results of the estimation exercise for the whole sample, 
and the different specifications and econometric techniques, using the changes in the 
structural primary balance (∆SPBt) as dependent variable. The values of the structural 
balance and the output gap correspond to those obtained with λ=6.7 in the H-P filter and 
with the estimated revenue elasticities. In general, the outcome of the analysis is strongly 
supportive of our hypothesis and is robust to the choices of other λs and public revenue 
elasticities. 
Column (1) of each table shows the results of the simplest model in which only the 
changes in the current threshold balance are included. As sustained in the previous section, 
this variable positively, and significantly, affects the structural primary balance. Besides, 
when the sustainability conditions, embodied by the sustainability gap, are included in the 
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regression [column (2)], the coefficient associated to changes in CTB increases its point 
estimate and becomes somehow more significant, while the error correction coefficient 
is negative and highly significant. This can be taken as a strong evidence that countries 
adjust their fiscal stance to changes in the sustainability conditions, but to a greater extent 
when the degree of sustainability of debt becomes a genuine concern. Also, the significance 
of the parameter in column (1) –when the error correction term is not introduced– is probably 
due to the existence of sustainability concerns in most of the sample (most countries and 
most periods as observed in graph 4). 
Including the output gap in column (3) allows to determine whether the results in the 
previous sections, which strongly backed the procyclicality of the fiscal stance in Latin 
America, are maintained when controlling for debt sustainability. The parameter obtained in 
table 3 for the equivalent regression was -0,14 and it was highly significant. The parameter 
associated to the output gap in column (3) of table 4A has decreased to -0.11 but it is still 
significant. The interpretation for this result would be that, from an econometric perspective, 
the procyclicality of the fiscal stance could not be completely explained by the debt 
sustainability considerations. However, since the fixed effects estimator does not account for 
regressor endogeneity, this estimate is biased. When proper estimation methods are 
employed [see column (3) of tables 4B and 4C], the output gap coefficient is no longer 
significant (although it retains its negative sign), lending support to the hypothesis that the 
sustainability concern is the main factor driving the behaviour of fiscal policy in Latin America. 
The last column in tables 4A-4C includes estimates of the more general model where 
the changes in inflation and the terms of trade are used as controls, which, in short, confirm 
the results previously obtained. The degree of significance of the change in the CTB and the 
sustainability gap term are marginally reduced, while neither the inflation rate nor the terms 
of trade turned out to be statistically significant. In the case of the latter variable this should 
be no surprise, since we have filtered out the impact of commodity prices on the structural 
primary balance and the terms of trade in the region are mainly driven by these prices. The 
positive, though non-significant, sign of the inflation rate coefficient would favour either 
the relevance of seignorage shocks or the Patinkin effect of inflation on public finances. 
Tables 5A-5C can be seen as robustness tests. Tables 5A-5C display the results 
using as dependent variable the overall primary balance, instead of the structural primary 
balance. It is remarkable –see column (1)– that the relation between ∆CTB and ∆PB is not 
significant and besides with an unstable sign, which changes across specifications. This 
means that when the cycle is taken into account in the fiscal figures, the significance of CTB 
disappears. The reason for this is precisely that at times of ∆CTB deterioration the primary 
balance is reduced due to the fall in activity27. This effect is enough to drive a wedge between 
the results of the primary balance and the structural primary balance. Notwithstanding this, 
when the error correction term is introduced, in column (2), the results are similar to those 
of tables 4A-4C, although with a lower degree of significance. Another interesting result is that 
in this case the change in the terms of trade is positive and statistically significant, as one 
would expect, since the overall primary balance has not been filtered out for the effects of 
commodity prices. Moreover, the coefficient for the inflation rate is positive and highly 
statistically significant, lending support to the hypothesis that inflation has a positive impact on 
the public accounts. 
                                                                          
27. The correlation between ∆CTB and the output gap is negative and strongly significant. 
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4 Conclusions 
The procyclicality of Latin American countries fiscal policy is another unfortunate feature of the 
region that exerts a destabilizing effect on activity. The robust evidence presented in this 
paper, both on the procyclicality of fiscal policy and its close link with debt sustainability 
concerns, underscores the deep relationship of this feature with the general financial 
problems of this region. Indeed, financial vulnerability in Latin America is not only related to 
the level of debt but to the volatility of financing conditions and its impact has on the financing 
ability of fiscal authorities. Therefore, key words in the economic tribulations of the region in 
the last decades like original sin or debt intolerance exert also a durable influence on the 
behaviour of fiscal policy, as we have shown. 
Looking ahead, the improvement in the financing conditions and the improvement of 
vulnerability indicators in the last years would suggest that fiscal policy may achieve a 
stabilizing role in the next cycles. However, the evidence for the recent years does not back 
this presumption. As a matter of fact, after a severe fiscal adjustment in the previous 
downturn (years 2001-2002) the current recovery has also implied an improvement in 
the fiscal accounts in terms of revenues and expenditure, even after controlling for the cycle. 
It must be stressed in any case that fiscal discipline, and the commitment to it by fiscal 
authorities is perceived to be higher. This bodes well for the future, but it cannot 
be disregarded that a future downturn if accompanied by a financial crunch will, again, drive 
the fiscal policy into a restrictive stance. 
Also note that the bottom line of the paper, v. g., that sustainability concerns impinge 
on the  fiscal stance over the cycle, do not always or necessarily point to the fiscal 
indiscipline of the fiscal authorities. It could be argued, on the contrary, that fiscal policy 
is forced to adjust to financial circumstances, some of which fall beyond the control of 
the policymakers as we know. All in all, what is clear is that the more sustained and decisive 
is the fiscal discipline effort the less debt sustainability concerns will play a role in determining 
fiscal policy, since countries will reduce their fiscal vulnerability and enhance their 
creditworthiness. 
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6 TABLES 
Table 1: Elasticities of fiscal revenues with respect to real GDP and commodity 
GDP Commodity GDP Commodity
Argentina 1.538 Mexico 0.647 0.109
[0.256]*** [0.116]*** [0.042]**
Brazil 1.723 Peru 1.595
[0.228]*** [0.208]***
Chile 0.7 1 Uruguay 1.510
[0.067]***
Colombia 1.833 0.195 Venezuela 0.153 0.134
[0.080]*** [0.039]*** [0.199] [0.064]*
Ecuador 0.522 0.077
[0.296]* [0.029]**
Note: Estimated by Dynamic OLS through 1980-2004 with annual real data. Revenues adjusted by out
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 2A: Slope coefficients of  change in SPB on output gap 
SPB calculated using the estimated elasticity of government revenues to GDP
Correlation OLS Correlation OLS
Argentina -0.216 -0.090 -0.268 -0.077**
Brazil -0.153 -0.259 -0.186 -0.235*
Chile 0.214 0.259 0.290 0.243
Colombia -0.123 -0.122 -0.193 -0.095
Ecuador 0.008 0.003 -0.109 -0.062
Mexico -0.140 -0.090 -0.017 0.008
Peru -0.386 -0.248*** -0.410 -0.194***
Uruguay -0.531 -0.327*** -0.517 -0.212***
Venezuela -0.302 -0.231 -0.283 -0.177
OLS estimation, robust standard errors. Pairwise correlations.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for OLS estimates
Table 2B: Slope coefficients of  change in SPB on output gap 
SPB calculated using a unit elasticity of government revenues to GDP
Correlation OLS Correlation OLS
Argentina -0.132 -0.052 -0.206 -0.054*
Brazil -0.107 -0.180 -0.145 -0.180
Chile 0.252 0.334 0.251 0.209
Colombia -0.049 -0.047 -0.155 -0.074
Ecuador -0.047 -0.031 -0.161 -0.096
Mexico -0.133 -0.090 -0.010 -0.005
Peru -0.339 -0.211** -0.374 -0.169**
Uruguay -0.462 -0.274*** -0.480 -0.182***
Venezuela -0.397 -0.352** -0.381 -0.280**
OLS estimation, robust standard errors. Pairwise correlations.
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively, for OLS estimates
lambda=6.7
lambda=6.7
lambda=100
lambda=100
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Table 4A: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA
Dependent variable: D(SPB) =change in structural primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) 0.181 0.295 0.276 0.269
[0.055]*** [0.051]*** [0.052]*** [0.054]***
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.319 -0.278 -0.276
[0.047]*** [0.051]*** [0.053]***
GAP -0.109 -0.112
[0.052]** [0.052]**
D(inflation) 0.0004
[0.0003]
Dlog(TOT) 0.010
[0.014]
constant 0.0009 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]* [0.002]
R2 0.063 0.220 0.250 0.263
Observations 170 170 170 170
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, Fixed Effects estimator
Table 3: Panel data estimation of procyclicality of fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: change in structural primary balance
Lambda=6.7 and SPB calculated with the estimated revenue elasticity to GDP
FE RE FE FE
1981-2004 1981-1989 1981-1990 1991-2004
constant 0.0007 0.0007 0.004 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]
output gap -0.143 -0.141 -0.107 -0.181
[0.053]*** [0.051]*** [0.094] [0.059]***
R2 0.035 0.035 0.018 0.073
Observations 209 209 84 125
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Lambda=100 and SPB calculated with the estimated revenue elasticity to GDP
FE RE FE FE
1981-2004 1981-2004 1981-1990 1991-2004
constant 0.0010 0.001 0.004 -0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.005] [0.002]
output gap -0.088 -0.087 -0.076 -0.096
[0.039]** [0.038]*** [0.081] [0.038]**
R2 0.025 0.025 0.011 0.049
Observations 207 207 82 125
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
FE: fixed-effects estimator; RE: random effects estimator
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Table 4B: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: D(SPB) =change in structural primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) 0.239 0.442 0.434 0.450
[0.108]* [0.143]** [0.134]** [0.171]**
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.416 -0.385 -0.368
[0.102]*** [0.109]*** [0.114]**
GAP -0.094 -0.089
[0.074] [0.073]
D(inflation) 0.0004
[0.0002]*
Dlog(TOT) 0.016
[0.024]
Observations 158 158 158 158
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
AR(1) (p-value) 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
AR(2) (p-value) 0.21 0.07 0.07 0.19
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
GMM: GMM difference estimator (See Arellano and Bond, 1991). PB(-2)-CTB(-2) used as only instrument.
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, GMM difference estimator
Table 4C: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: D(SPB) =change in structural primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) 0.370 0.536 0.510 0.504
[0.131]*** [0.129]*** [0.181]*** [0.185]***
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.408 -0.397 -0.359
[0.140]*** [0.185]** [0.195]*
GAP -0.067 -0.080
[0.125] [0.120]
D(inflation) 0.0005
[0.0003]
Dlog(TOT) 0.017
[0.016]
Observations 158 158 158 158
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.20 0.50 0.23 0.36
Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
IV: IV estimator for the differenced equation. D(CTB) and PB(-1)-CTB(-1) instrumented with SPB(-2), CTB(-2), 
PB(-2)-CTB(-2) and GAP(-1). Sargan-Hansen Tests of overidentification restrictions.
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, IV estimation
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Table 5B: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: D(PB) =change in primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) -0.007 0.218 0.205 0.218
[0.110] [0.127] [0.108]* [0.139]
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.301 -0.286 -0.248
[0.108]** [0.108]** [0.094]**
GAP -0.034 -0.012
[0.083] [0.066]
D(inflation) 0.0006
[0.0002]***
Dlog(TOT) 0.031
[0.011]**
Observations 158 158 158 158
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
AR(1) (p-value) 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
AR(2) (p-value) 0.39 0.25 0.24 0.55
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
GMM: GMM difference estimator (See Arellano and Bond, 1991). PB(-2)-CTB(-2) used as only instrument.
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, GMM difference estimator
Table 5A: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: D(PB) =change in primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) 0.023 0.120 0.112 0.106
[0.049] [0.047]** [0.047]** [0.048]**
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.272 -0.254 -0.248
[0.043]*** [0.047]*** [0.048]***
GAP -0.046 -0.040
[0.047] [0.047]
D(inflation) 0.0004
[0.0003]
Dlog(TOT) 0.029
[0.013]**
constant 0.0004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
[0.002] [0.002]* [0.002]* [0.002]
R2 0.001 0.153 0.163 0.205
Observations 170 170 170 170
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, Fixed Effects estimator
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Table 5C: Panel data estimation of financial restrictions effects on fiscal policy in LA 
Dependent variable: D(PB) =change in primary balance
Sample:1981-2004
(1) (2) (3) (4)
D(CTB) 0.065 0.186 0.203 0.227
[0.125] [0.136] [0.170] [0.140]*
PB(-1)-CTB(-1) -0.280 -0.294 -0.352
[0.132]** [0.179]* [0.144]**
GAP -0.015 0.039
[0.131] [0.107]
D(inflation) 0.0006
[0.0003]**
Dlog(TOT) 0.033
[0.011]***
Observations 146 146 146 146
No. Of countries 9 9 9 9
Sargan-Hansen Test (p-value) 0.48 0.43 0.38 0.39
Robust standard errors in brackets. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
IV: IV estimator for the differenced equation. D(CTB) and PB(-1)-CTB(-1) instrumented with DCTB(-2), PB(-2)-CTB(-2),
 PB(-3)-CTB(-3), Dinflation(-1), GAP(-1) and GAP(-2). Sargan-Hansen Tests of overidentification restrictions.
All regressions include dummies that account for the periods in which any country was declared to be 
in default by Standard and Poor's. These dummies turned out to be negative, though non-significant.
Panel regression, IV estimation
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7 GRAPHS 
Graph 1. Change in the structural primary balance and output gap: cross country 
comparisons. 
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Graph 2. Change in the structural primary balance against the output gap: panel scatter plot 
(with de-meaned variables). 
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Graph 3. Recursive and rolling regressions of change in SPB on the output gap. 
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Graph 4. Change in the primary balance, public debt and current threshold balance: cross 
country comparisons 
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Graph 5. Scatter plot of the change in the structural primary balance on the change in the 
current threshold balance 
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